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Introduction
When Thomas Kuhn fi rst introduced the terms “paradigm” and “paradigm shifts” in his 1962 book, The 
Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions, the intent was to address the changing nature of scientifi c knowledge 
and how it was conceived. However, as Joe Kincheloe shares in his 1993 book, Toward a Critical Politics of 
Teacher Thinking, these terms can apply to a broad spectrum of contexts, particularly education. My intrigue 
with Kuhn’s terms is specifi cally relevant to epistemologies and ontologies, and their potential implications 
for education.
What is the role of education, and what is our teaching role? There are those who advocate educators 
being transformative intellectuals where teaching becomes an emancipatory process for learners to become 
knowledgeable and vocal citizens within a hopeful democratic society (Freire 1985; Giroux 1988; Kincheloe 
1999, 2000). Unfortunately, as Henry Giroux (1988) and Joe Kincheloe (1999) note, conditions must be 
established to enable learners to become such citizens. Likewise, educational settings require conditions that 
allow educators to become transformative intellectuals without fear of reprisals, retribution, ostracization, 
and censure. Are we, as educators, allowed to be transformative intellectuals? Are we genuinely encouraged 
to advocate transformative intellectualism among our students?
I am a little pessimistic about this, particularly with regard to my experiences as an educator for nearly 
two decades in the United States. As unusual as this seems, perhaps the late comedian Steven Allen said 
it best.
Do schools teach us how to think? They do not. They teach us what to think. But it’s odd that 
at a time when “consciousness raising” is at least relatively popular, thinking itself has nevertheless 
enlisted the support of relatively few defenders, even though it is one of the chief means of raising 
one’s consciousness. (Allen 1998, 41)
Epistemologies and Ontologies
Perhaps an examination of these terms is necessary. Many dictionaries defi ne epistemology in terms of a 
philosophy of knowledge. I take a slightly different perspective, primarily due to the word “ontology.” While 
some dictionaries may defi ne ontology in terms of a philosophy or belief of being, or reality, I take a rather 
postmodern view and defi ne ontology as a philosophy of knowledge.
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Why? Both Reinders Duit and David Treagust (1998), and Stella Vosniadou and William Brewer (1992) 
describe “ontological belief ” in terms of categorizing the world; I interpret this to be a philosophical recog-
nition of knowledge, as in what constitutes knowledge. In this current era of education and accountability, 
we continuously deal with the issue of content knowledge recognized only as testable knowledge (Shiland 
1998). If knowledge is only recognized according to assessment, of what ultimate value is it? Is learning 
merely for the sake of assessment and short-term competency? (Kincheloe 1991, 1993; Pushkin 1998a, 
1998b, 1998c, 2001c, 2001d)
What constitutes knowledge? The words of textbooks? Are other perspectives trustworthy (e.g., indig-
enous knowledge)? To what degree are multiple views essentially equivalent? Recent scholarly writing is 
dedicated to this debate (Aikenhead and Jegede 1999; Akatugba and Wallace 1999; Allen and Crawley 
1998; Atwater 1996; Tobin, McRobbie, and Anderson 1997; Waldrip and Taylor 1999). My point is, what 
do we acknowledge and respect, or dismiss, as knowledge, and what criteria do we use to make such distinc-
tions? Is one person’s knowledge another’s irrelevant nonsense? Is only one view “The Truth,” and all others 
inferior fallacy, or is “truth” contextual? (Pushkin 2001a)
Is there a worldview of information, subcategorized as knowledge and triviality? In essence, what do we 
deem “reality” and what do we deem, for lack of a better word, “fantasy”? Or is knowledge contextual? 
(Kincheloe 1991, 1999; Kincheloe, Steinberg, and Tippins 1992) Is reality contextual? This is the signifi -
cance of ontological beliefs and/or views: they are individual and contextual; no one view is worthier than 
another at mere face value. This is not to say one view cannot be correct, but certain conditions need to be 
met; this is no different from how we view scientifi c laws and boundary conditions. Within a discipline of 
knowledge, there can be a correct view, or a “truth.” However, in philosophical terms, the correctness of a 
view is personalized and contextualized.
If an ontological view represents how one recognizes knowledge, what does an epistemological view rep-
resent? Because one’s ontology addresses a question of what knowledge is, it stands to reason an epistemol-
ogy relates to a question of how knowledge exists. In other words, how is knowledge defi ned? How is it 
acquired? How is it evaluated? How is it shared?
Ultimately, we might be able to consider ontological views the philosophical underpinning to curricula, 
theory, and policy, and epistemological views the philosophical underpinning to pedagogy, practice, and 
modus operandi. Not only may both views go hand-in-hand; one may support or justify the other (Elliott 
1998; Goodson 1993; Scheurich 1997). This can manifest in various ways: course enrollments, book 
choices, modes of assessment, expectations of faculty, decisions to reward, and decisions to punish.
From a curricular perspective, we need to understand and appreciate how knowledge is constructed, not 
in terms of learning theories, but in terms of arbiters of knowledge exchange. In other words, who decides 
on the curriculum content, the mode of assessment, and the textbooks? Who ultimately possesses the power 
and control over knowledge in schools, at any educational level? For example, how much voice did science 
teachers in Kansas have regarding the debate to teach evolution? (Pushkin 2001c, 2001d) From a pedagogi-
cal perspective, we need to understand and appreciate how knowledge is acquired, shared, and assessed, not 
in terms of pedagogical theories, but in terms of power relationships, personal meaning, and knowledge 
regulation. Is knowledge holistic or disconnected? Is learning viewed holistically or in terms of the whole 
never being greater than the sum of its parts? (Kincheloe 1999)
Consider Vygotsky’s concept of mediation, but for all learning contexts (children and adults). The author-
ity fi gure in a classroom, even a university lecture hall, has enormous infl uence on learners. A professor can 
be a nurturing facilitator or a hegemonic gatekeeper, stifl ing students’ desire to think and learn (Pushkin 
2001a, 2001b). Ultimately, we ask whether students learn to be passive, deskilled, superfi cial thinkers, or 
conscious, empowered, deep, critical thinkers (Kincheloe 1999). Do students get their “money’s worth” or 
do they feel unfulfi lled at the end of learning experiences? (Pushkin 1999, 2001b) Are students encouraged 
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to look beyond “factoids” (Kincheloe 1991) and textbook glossaries for deeper and broader meanings? Are 
they encouraged to challenge themselves beyond the boundaries of their course syllabi?
But more importantly, are students engaged in active discussion or debate about the validity of knowl-
edge, or do they merely record it as the gospel, dictated by authorities? What message does this send to 
aspiring educators, who may not have the sophistication to discriminate between positive and negative 
teaching/learning experiences? What practices will they unconsciously perpetuate? What new paths will 
they blaze, and how will they have the capacity to blaze such paths? If new generations come from a culture 
unfamiliar with transformative intellectualism, how will they someday help create this new culture? Where 
is their model? In short, as faculty members of the university community, it’s us!
Relevance
Kuhn’s infl uence on my epistemology refl ects more of what Jerome Bruner shares in his 1996 book The 
Culture of Education. Bruner notes science’s ability to resist “scientifi c revolutions.” Scientifi c knowledge was 
supposed to be fairly stable, tried, and true. I wish to take this thought further, for there is knowledge, and 
then there is the process of knowledge. By scientifi c knowledge being resistant to revolutions, one could 
infer that science itself becomes what the nineteenth-century philosopher Herbert Spencer considered 
mostly inert—a collection of dead facts (DeBoer 1991; Hurd 1998). Course content could be considered 
”stuff ” teachers disseminate in classical “chalk-and-talk” lecture mode. Facts are facts, and constants are 
numbers to substitute into algorithms. No one is to question the origins, as such information is considered 
sacred and valid through the generations. Perhaps this is a bit extreme. Students of all generations need 
to have the opportunity to explore, question, and critique scientifi c knowledge as it has evolved and contin-
ues to evolve. Those who do not question knowledge essentially become “cognitive capitulators” (Pushkin 
2001a, 2001b).
However, we should appreciate a subtle distinction within this discussion in terms of knowledge versus 
process of knowledge. Again, we return to our fundamental concepts of epistemologies and ontologies. 
In terms of science, several aspects of knowledge have evolved greatly due to signifi cant paradigm shifts. 
Copernicus helped us to view the solar system as heliocentric. Priestly, Scheele, and Lavosier helped us 
understand the existence and signifi cance of oxygen. Einstein helped us to view motion in an entirely new 
context. By questioning the sense and validity of current knowledge, these men and others brought us fur-
ther along the continuum of understanding the works of nature and our universe. If such knowledge went 
unquestioned, who knows what knowledge we would possess as we begin a new millennium?
Granted, many scientifi c principles have stood the test of time and remained “stable.” Sometimes, prin-
ciples were erroneously accepted and sustained, based on a priori limited assumptions. Who knew atoms 
contained neutrons, until subsequent experimental data suggested fl aws in theoretical models? Then again, 
on a more contemporary level, who knew vote count projection models were fundamentally fl awed until 
last year’s U.S. presidential election? Until we’re confronted with a genuine reason to question the general 
validity of a principle, we’re inclined to accept and advocate it.
Sometimes, principles indeed remain “stable” for the “right” reasons; sometimes they remain “stable” for 
the “wrong” reasons. The same could be said for changing principles. In other words, principles can with-
stand the test of challenges or not be challenged at all. Principles can also change due to asking better ques-
tions and posing better challenges, or they can change for the sake of change.
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Implications
The process of thought and questioning (e.g., metacognition) doesn’t have to remain “stable.” Taking things 
to an extreme, this stability can be viewed as an intellectual inertia of sorts. Regardless of knowledge, or 
its context, the process of knowledge (under the constraints of intellectual inertia) remains constant, as if 
thinking doesn’t evolve. History expands, language evolves, and science innovates, but this is all supposedly 
independent of the human mind. How troubling, and yet this is the essential foundation to transformative 
intellectualism. How can things take place independent of the human mind? How can the world grow, 
yet leave the mind unaffected? Kuhn’s assertion that scientifi c knowledge was resistant to paradigmatic 
shifts and revolutions sadly lends truth to common pedagogical and curricular practices we continue to 
cringe at. This resistance is more than resistance; it is a hegemonic inertia. As our world and knowledge 
continue to grow, how is it that education still retains contradictory perspectives towards teaching and 
learning? Knowledge evolves, but the process of knowledge doesn’t? It simply doesn’t make sense. This 
would resemble Albert Einstein formulating his theory of general relativity assuming Newtonian mechan-
ics was universally valid.
There seems to be a great disconnection within education. Apparently, knowledge evolves in contrast 
to an inertial process of knowledge. On the other hand, when education is viewed to evolve, we forget to 
contextualize the knowledge. In my mind, Kuhn strikes a personal cord, since we are observing a slow and 
painful paradigm shift within education. This paradigm shift, however, is quite complex, as several indi-
vidual “sub-shifts” exist: issues of content coverage, modes of assessment, teacher preparation, and academic 
accountability. Somehow, the critical issue seems to be our collective inability to resolve what to do (e.g., 
pedagogy and curricula) with knowledge as it has evolved.
Consequently, the most crucial paradigm shift I see within education involves a collective dysfunction. 
Teachers and students alike cling to their epistemological and ontological sacred cows, where the same 
decontextualized content is presented for passive consumption. Learning activities and assessment seek to 
confi rm an assumed conclusion, emphasizing short-term reiteration of the arbitrary. That’s not to say our 
course content is wrong, but how we package it might be. In many cases, the answers of yesterday remain 
the answers of today. People, dates, and places don’t necessarily change, nor do chemical formulas or math-
ematical algorithms. But how do we come to understand and appreciate those people, dates, and places? 
How do we come to understand and appreciate those chemical formulas and mathematical algorithms? As 
I’ve discussed, it’s more than simply concerning ourselves with what knowledge needs to be learned, but 
how it should be learned.
As we strive to shift away from this dysfunction, somehow it remains entrenched. The paradigm of stasis 
is so strong it resists and censors those seeking to change the paradigm. Both Michael Fullan (1993) and 
Peter Senge (1990) refer to education as a conservative system. By conservative, they did not necessarily 
mean political leanings, but perhaps meant it analogous to scientifi c laws of conservation (e.g., energy, mass, 
electric charge). Is it possible that, no matter how many reforms or innovations we enact, education will 
somehow return to its original form? Fullan warns us of the perils of reform starting at the periphery, and 
for good reason. If the core of a system remains intact, so does the power hierarchy; hence, reform fails, for 
it’s incomplete. Essentially, it’s change for change’s sake, but there’s really no fundamental change at all.
What seems to be missing? For a starting point, perhaps the key ingredient is consciousness (Allen 1998; 
Freire 1973). Somehow education lacks enough of this. We struggle to evolve but are fundamentally unclear 
as to what we’re evolving from or towards. Do we genuinely have our own philosophical baselines? I’m 
perpetually trying to resolve and establish mine after many years of being a student and educator.
Transformative intellectuals need to create a steady barrage of opportunities for people to dare look them-
selves in a mirror and challenge their personal truths, realities, and sense of safety and comfort. But people 
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are perhaps too terrifi ed to look and deconstruct, fearing the unknown within themselves. Introspection and 
growth may be too much to ask of those who know no differently. It is too painful to face challenges already 
presumed conquered, for this requires too much time and effort, as well as acknowledging our inherent fl aws 
and a need to demand better of ourselves. Infallibility is a delusion, yet we reward the delusion to placate 
ourselves. For safety’s sake and self-preservation, we suppress the challenge, shroud the mirror, and maintain 
a “cocoon of familiarity” (Pushkin 2001b). And yet, why should we assume pretty butterfl ies always come 
from the cocoon?
Yes, Kuhn’s ideas have affected me, but in a troubling way. As I have become more conscious of my per-
sonal epistemological and ontological evolution, I observe too many who cannot and will not evolve. And 
this continues in our present-day education settings. These ideas remind me not to be a pedagogical hypo-
crite, to practice what I preach, and to emphasize the long-term growth and maturation of my students, 
both cognitively and affectively. These ideas remind me to be sensitive to the learning process and guide my 
students through it, but intellectually. Teaching and intellectualism mean more than knowledge itself; the 
process is perhaps ultimately more important than the product.
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